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NOT QUITE HIGH NOON FOR GUNMAKERS, BUT
IT'S COMING: WHY HAMILTON STILL MEANS
NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY IN THEIR FUTURE*
Daniel L. Feldmant
INTRODUCTION
With very few exceptions, American courts have not
endorsed mass tort claims against handgun manufacturers.
Questions of cause-in-fact and whether third parties have a
duty of care to strangers have posed significant obstacles.
Likewise, plaintiffs' defeat before the Second Circuit in
Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.' gave credence to the
defendant gun manufacturers' protests throughout the lawsuit
* ©2001 Daniel L. Feldman. All Rights Reserved.
t A.B., Columbia College 1970; J.D., Harvard Law School 1973. The author is
Director of the Legal Policy and Program Development Unit in the Office of the New
York State Attorney General. Views expressed herein are solely those of the author,
not of the Office of Attorney General. The author gratefully acknowledges editorial
assistance from the staff of the Brooklyn Law Review as well as from Page Croyder, a
dedicated and talented Maryland prosecutor.
1 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Beretta III]. The Second Circuit relied
here on answers to the questions it had certified to the New York Court of Appeals, so
the New York court produced the legal reasoning at the heart of the matter.
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that the law was "settled": victims of handgun violence cannot
successfully sue handgun manufacturers for negligence. If, as
the gun industry had maintained for many years, the vast bulk
of guns used to commit crime were stolen, then negligent
distribution and marketing had little affect on the availability
of guns to criminals.
But plaintiffs' defeat was not premised upon the old
factual understandings and prior theories of liability. In
certifying key questions, the Second Circuit gave the New York
Court of Appeals ("Court of Appeals") the opportunity to break
new ground by questioning supposedly "settled" law, an
opportunity the Court of Appeals embraced: "This case
challenges us to rethink traditional notions of duty, liability,
and causation."2 And indeed, the Court of Appeals did break
new ground, although it could not justify recognition of a gun
manufacturer's duty of care to victims of gun violence on the
basis of the facts presented.3
In Hamilton, the Court of Appeals, for the first time in
the United States, 4 issued an opinion that in effect took judicial
notice of the changed factual context. Instead of rejecting
outright the possibility that negligence could apply, as had so
many other courts, 5 it noted explicitly that plaintiffs might
2 Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 222, 242, 750 N.E.2d 1055,
1068, 727 N.Y.S.2d 7, 20 (2001) [hereinafter Beretta Ill.
3 id.
4 The court described its decision as "in accord with most jurisdictions that
have considered this issue," with a long string of citations, id. at 238 n.6, 750 N.E.2d at
1064-65 n.6, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 16-17 n.6, and properly distinguished "two notable
exceptions" both of which involved "different factual contexts and different theories of
negligent marketing not relevant here." Id. In the more prominent case, the California
Supreme Court subsequently reversed, ruling that the gun manufacturer could not be
held liable. The California Court held that plaintiffs' negligence claim was a disguised
products liability/design defect claim, and as such was precluded by a California
statute, CAL. CIV. CODE 1714.4(a) (Deering 1999). Merrill v. Navegar, 28 P.3d 116, 122
(Cal. 2001).
5 See, e.g., Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 1999 OHIO MISC. LEXIS 27, at
*8 (Hamilton Cnty. C.P. Ohio, Sept. 27, 1999) afrid, 2000 WL 1133078 (Ohio Ct. App.
Aug. 11, 2000). The court held:
[U]nder Ohio law, in order to hold a defendant liable in negligence for
the criminal conduct of a third party, the defendant must owe a duty
arising out of a special relationship between the defendant and the
third party giving rise to an ability to control the conduct of that third
party, or there must be a special relationship which requires the
defendant to protect the plaintiff.
Id. See also Penelas v. Arms Technology, 1999 WL 1204353, at *3 (Fla. Cir. Ct., l1th
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succeed in a negligence cause of action if they can show that
manufacturers knowingly supply wholesalers who regularly
distribute guns into the criminal market.6
The trial court had permitted the jury to assess
damages against several gun manufacturers on the basis of
injuries inflicted with the use of only one gun which was never
recovered and could not be linked to any manufacturer. 7 The
Court of Appeals rejected the trial court's application of the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard and of market-share
liability to the facts of Hamilton. But when other plaintiffs, as
in Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta,8 are
able to come forward with computer print-outs of thousands of
guns traced to crime, each identified by serial number and
manufacturer, the outcome may well be different. The Court of
Appeals has removed the conceptual barrier, a sufficiently
important breakthrough to compel attention here, leaving only
an evidentiary obstacle to a negligence-based cause of action.
The Court of Appeals has cast a long shadow over the
future of gun manufacturers by raising the specter of an
alternative to market-share liability, one based on proportional
causation instead, that may also be imposed without linking a
particular manufacturer to a particular weapon and to a
particular injury.9
Now that the Court of Appeals has established the logic
for doing so, states should eventually impose liability on
handgun manufacturers for damages caused by negligent
distribution of their product either through entities they
control, or by virtue of non-delegable duties of care to the
public through their independent contractors. As the Court of
Dist. Dec. 13, 1999), affd, 778 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) ("Florida law does
not impose a duty on a defendant to protect others from the criminal and reckless
behavior of a third person unless there is a special relationship between the defendant
and the plaintiff, or the defendant and the third person"); Bubalo v. Navegar, No.
96C3664, 1997 WL 337218 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 1997).
6 Beretta II, 96 N.Y.2d at 237, 750 N.E.2d at 1064, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 16; see also
Beretta III, 264 F.3d at 28.
7 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
[hereinafter Accu-Tek], inter alia (that is why the jury assessed damages against three
different gun manufacturers).
8 123 F. Supp. 2d 245 (D.N.J. 2000) (dismissing public nuisance, negligent
entrustment, and negligence claims), affd, 273 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001).
9 Beretta 11, 96 N.Y.2d at 235, 241 n.11, 750 N.E.2d at 1062-63, 1067 n.11, 727
N.Y.S.2d at 14-15, 19 n.ll.
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Appeals suggested, a successful liability theory in the handgun
manufacturer negligent distribution context must rest on
proportional causation, abandoning the traditional
"preponderance of the evidence" test.
Part I of this Article suggests that the cultural context
of American jurisprudence has been significantly responsible
for most courts' reluctance, thus far, to recognize the facts that
should drive handgun manufacturer liability. Part II sets forth
the district court's handling of the duty question in Hamilton v.
Accu-Tek and explains how the Court of Appeals found that,
although the plaintiffs in Hamilton did not satisfy the
requirements of the elements of negligence, there is a proper
way for future litigants to do so. Part II continues with an
alternative theory of handgun manufacturers' liability for
negligence: even if they do not control the chain of distribution,
they remain liable under one or two exceptions to the rule that
exempts principals from the torts of their independent
contractors. The first excepts principals who contract out
inherently dangerous undertakings. The second excepts
principals who negligently select their independent
contractors. Part III explains the availability of the theory of
proportional causation, and why the courts may allow findings
of liability on that theory but preclude liability on older
theories.
I. THE CULTURAL CONTEXT OF AMERICAN HANDGUN
MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY JURISPRUDENCE
Our society subjects other comparably dangerous
instrumentalities to regulatory schemes that safeguard or
compensate the public far more adequately than they can with
respect to handguns, in the absence of tort liability. Cigarette
manufacturers have incurred tort liability, albeit initially de
facto by way of settlements, for a product which also harms
substantial numbers of people. Dram shop acts have imposed
third-party liability on purveyors of alcohol by the drink, but
common-law tort liability was beginning to emerge before
legislatures took action.10 We can regulate automobiles, which
10 At common law, and apart from statute, no redress existed
against persons selling, giving, or furnishing intoxicating liquor for
[Vol. 67: 2
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kill comparable numbers of people as handguns do, through a
reasonably effective scheme of licensing, registration, and
insurance. However, no comparable scheme can be applied to
handguns: criminals will not buy liability insurance to
compensate their victims, even if society enacts legislation
requiring them to do so.
Why has it taken the United States so long to develop
the law and facts in the handgun context? In Great Britain,
where such events are relatively rare, sixteen children and
their teacher were massacred with a handgun in March 1996.11
Within seven months, a groundswell of support for gun control
moved the government to ban large caliber handguns, and the
subsequent Labor Government extended the ban to virtually
all such handguns a few months later.12
Guns have a special place in American jurisprudence
because guns have a special place in American society, and
jurisprudence reflects culture. For Americans brought up on
cowboy movies, and almost all of us were, the good guy
outdraws the bad guy and shoots him dead. From John Wayne
to Roy Rogers to Clint Eastwood to Charles Bronson to Bruce
Willis, good guys shooting bad guys overwhelmingly dominated
resulting injuries or damages due to the acts of intoxicated persons,
either on the theory that the dispensing of the liquor constituted a
direct wrong or that it constituted actionable negligence. This rule was
based on the theory that the proximate cause of the injury was the act
of the purchaser in drinking the liquor and not the vendor in selling it.
• . . In recent years, many states have retreated from or have
abrogated the strict common-law rule. Fourteen states now have dram
shop statutes which give, generally, a right of action to persons
injured in person, property, or means of support, by an intoxicated
person, or in consequence of the intoxication of any person, against the
person selling or furnishing the liquor which caused the intoxication
in whole or in part. . . . Courts in 29 jurisdictions, including the
District of Columbia, have judicially abrogated the common-law
doctrine of no liability . . . Many of the jurisdictions which now
recognize a common-law right of action do so on the premise that the
serving of liquor to a minor or an inebriated person initiates a
foreseeable chain of events for which the tavern owner may be held
liable.
Ling v. Jan's Liquor's, 703 P.2d 731, 735-36 (Kan. 1985).
1 Erlend Clouston & Sarah Boseley, Dunblane Massacre, GUARDIAN
CENTURY, Mar. 14, 1996, at http:l/www.guardiancentury.co.ukl19901999/story/-
0,6051,112749,00-.html. (last visited Nov. 14, 2001).
12 PETER SQUIRES, GUN CULTURE OR GUN CONTROL? FIREARMS, VIOLENCE AND
SOCIETY 5 (2000).
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American cinema. 13 This cowboy image has not faded over the
decades-merely morphed into a different type of "cowboy." As
an historian of America's gun culture wrote, "A generation of
Hollywood's maverick cowboys slipped effortlessly from their
western landscapes into identical roles as tough city cops in a
later film genre."14
Before there was such a thing as American cinema,
American myth, folklore, history, and literature encouraged
the same themes; the Revolution, the Alamo, Daniel Boone,
Davy Crockett, James Fenimore Cooper's Natty Bumpo, 15 and
Wyatt Earp, all featured heroic Americans shooting guns at
bad guys.' 6 No matter how sophisticated citizens may be,
somewhere in the back of their minds lurks the fantasy that
someday, they will do likewise against an armed criminal.
Perhaps even more important, guns have a special place
in the American value system as a guarantor of the ability to
resist oppression. Notwithstanding our generally positive
experience with government, a strong skepticism toward
government runs through American history, from Thomas
Paine, most radically, and from Thomas Jefferson, whose
-4 In the 1950s,
[tihe Shane [a 1953 movie starring Alan Ladd] plot-formula of a
gunfighter from outside aiding a helpless community was perhaps the
most frequently raised. Representative [emphasis added] titles include
Man Without a Star (1955); Tall T (1957); Proud Rebel (1958); At
Gunpoint (1955); Johnny Concho (1956); Man From Del Rio (1956);
Fury from Showdown,.Gun for a Coward, Gun Glory (1957); and Last
of the Fast Guns (1958).
RICHARD SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION 402 (1992).
Then there was the 1952 Stanley Kramer movie High Noon, and some of the
"recastings of the OK Corral story... Law and Order (1953), A Man Alone (1955), Top
Gun (1955), Wichita (1955), Gunfight at the OK Corral (1957), The Tin Star (1958), Rio
Bravo (1959), and Warlock (1959)." Id. at 403. One might consider the trajectory of
progress in the 1960s from The Magnificent Seven (1960) to The Green Berets (1968),
when John Wayne was sixty. Id. at 520.
14 SQUIRES, supra note 12, at 57.
15 "The frontier romances of James Fenimore Cooper, published between 1823
and 1850, codified and systematized the representation of the frontier that had
developed haphazardly since 1700 in such diverse narratives as the personal narrative,
the history, the sermon, the newspaper item, the street ballad, and the 'penny
dreadful.' SLOTKIN, supra note 13, at 15.
16 The list could be vastly longer: "[firom the 1840s through the Reconstruction
period, most cheap frontier stories followed the formula of Cooper's historical
romances, using Indian warfare and captivities (actual or threatened) and a colonial or
Revolutionary War setting to provide a 'historical' context for the action of the plot."
SLOTKIN, supra note 13, at 127.
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vision of agrarian democracy included substantial distrust of
big and centralized government. Even George Washington
said: "A free people ought not only to be armed, but disciplined
... . ,17 Forty-three years later, Joseph Story expressed a
similar view: "The right of a citizen to keep and bear arms has
justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a
republic, since it offers a strong moral check against the
usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers .... 18
The same skepticism of government informs Sanford
Levinson's view that the framers intended the Second
Amendment to guarantee citizens more than the right to
participate in state-regulated militias; rather, that they
intended to arm citizens as a check against the overbearing use
of force by government itself.19 Whether or not his view
prevails as a legal interpretation, certainly the popular
understanding of the Second Amendment included the notion
that an armed citizenry can resist oppression. A.E. Van Vogt's
science fiction story, The Weapon Shop, provides a vivid
cultural illustration of this attitude. 20 First published in 1942,
the story portrays a distant future in which effective resistance
to a tyrannical galactic empire can only emerge from a chain of
weapon shops. Each weapon shop has a sign out front that
reads "The Right to Buy Weapons is the Right to Be Free."
Twenty-five years after its original publication, the members of
17 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 969 (1970) (quoted in Robert E. Shalhope, The
Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. OF AM. HISTORY 599, 611 (1982)).
18 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 746 (1833) (quoted in Shalhope, supra note 17, at 612).
19 Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637
(1989). Levinson quotes approvingly the view of an early twentieth-century libertarian
defender of both the First and Second Amendments, that "the obvious import [of the
constitutional guarantee to carry arms] is to promote a state of preparedness for self-
defense even against the invasions of government, because only governments have ever
disarmed any considerable class of people as a means toward their enslavement." Id. at
650 (quoting THEODORE SCHROEDER, FREE SPEECH FOR RADICALS 104 (reprint ed.
1969) (alteration in the original)). Against the view that has now been conventional for
decades, see e.g. Dennis A. Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment, 26
VAL. U. L. REv. 107, 107 (1991) C'The Second Amendment... has been devoid of
importance as a constitutional barrier to gun control laws."), Levinson thinks the
Second Amendment might provide the basis for challenging some gun control laws.
Levinson, supra at 650. The Fifth Circuit has now provided Levinson's views with
strong support in dicta in United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (2001).
20 A.E. Van Vogt, The Weapon Shop, in THE SCIENCE FICTION HALL OF FAME
183 (Robert Silverberg ed., 1970).
2001]
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Science Fiction Writers of America, hardly a right-wing
conservative organization, voted The Weapon Shop one of the
twenty-five best science fiction short stories of the pre-1965
period.21 This notion of gun ownership as a bedrock of freedom
pervades the story. It could only have commanded such respect
among its author's peers because it struck a chord in a culture
at large with a strong attachment to that same notion.
Jurisprudence has stymied efforts to hold even the most
egregious producers of "Saturday night specials" liable for the
harm done by the weapons they manufacture. But that
jurisprudence has had more than legal theory behind it. An
enormously powerful strain of American cultural tradition
underpins the "policy" decisions that the law explicitly allows
judges to make in the context of determining duties to third
parties in tort liability.
The National Rifle Association ("NRA") has been the
most prominent organization giving voice to that cultural
tradition, and has exercised the political power to block
important aspects of gun control. Although the NRA has long
complained that the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco &
Firearms ("BATF') "harasses honest gun owners and dealers,"
until the 1990s, at least in terms of their role at the national
policy level, the opposite criticism was more accurate: "that the
ATF [was] a weak and ineffective agency that has been
buffeted by the prevailing political winds, especially those
stirred up by the NRA."22
For a long time, the gun lobby prevented collection of
the data necessary to show the origin of most crime guns. In
1978, the Carter administration attempted to overcome the
gun lobby by supporting a $4.2 million appropriation for BATF
to computerize their mandated task of crime gun tracing. The
NRA furiously and successfully lobbied against the new
appropriation. When the NRA learned that BATF thought it
could fund the program from elsewhere in its budget, the NRA
was able to get Congress to cut the agency's regular
appropriation by the same amount.23
21 Id. at ix-x. See also Van Vogt's obituary, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2000, at A27
(reporting the initial publication date of "The Weapon Shops of Isher" as 1951).2 2 ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 127-28 (1998).
23 Id. at 129.
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But, the tide turned. The 1999 Columbine High School
massacre may forever symbolize the turning point, but the
bloody history of handgun violence in America, as publicized by
more pervasive media than the world had ever seen, had
already crystallized American public opinion.24 Public opinion
had supported the 1993 enactment of the Brady Law,25 well
before Columbine, and finally emboldened the Clinton White
House, in the late 1990s, to have BATF analyze crime gun
trace data effectively with computers to determine where crime
guns come from.
The conventional view, long promulgated by the NRA,
held that most criminals steal the guns they use from the
enormous existing stock of guns-more than two hundred
million, by most accounts-already in the homes of American
citizens.26 So long as no one knew any better, it seemed to
make little difference, therefore, how manufacturers marketed
and distributed their new handguns. In 1998, however, a
Northeastern University study based on records maintained by
BATF 27 demonstrated that the conventional wisdom was
wrong: more criminals buy their guns new than steal them.28
Based on firearms trafficking investigations performed
between July 1996 and December 1998 throughout the United
States, BATF determined that while over 11,000 of the
weapons traced were stolen from Federal Firearms Licensees
("FLs," or licensed gun dealers), residences, or from common
carriers transporting the guns, almost four times as many, or
24 See, e.g., Michael Janofsky, Concerns About Guns Put New Pressure on State
Legislatures, N.Y. TIES, Jan. 5, 2000, at A12 ("In the wake of the killings at
Columbine High School and elsewhere, polls show that a growing number of Americans
want their state representatives to do something to relieve gun violence.").2 5 SPITZER, supra note 22, at 119.
26 Fox Butterfield, Gun Flow to Criminals Laid to Tiny Fraction of Dealers,
N.Y. TwiES, July 1, 1999, at A14.
27 GLENN L. PIERCE, ET AL., NATIONAL REPORT ON FIREARM TRACE ANALYSIS
FOR 1996-1997, (1998). Federal law requires gun manufacturers, distributors, and
dealers to respond to requests from BATF for crime gun trace data. See 18 U.S.C. §
923(g)(7) (2001) and 27 C.F.R. § 178.25a (2002).
28 PIERCE ET AL., supra note 27, at 11, tbL 5; see also Butterfield, supra note
26, at 8 ("[Mjore than a fifth of all guns recovered in crimes in those two years had
been purchased from a licensed dealer less than a year earlier, and... almost half had
been bought from dealers within three years").
20011
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over 40,000, were trafficked by licensed dealers. 29 Of guns
trafficked to youth and juveniles, BATF found that only about
fourteen percent "involved firearms stolen from a residence,"
while half "involved firearms trafficked by straw purchasers,"
and a fifth involved firearms "stolen from a federally licensed
firearms dealer. '30 In mid-1999, the public first learned that a
small and identifiable percentage of those engaged by
manufacturers to sell their products wholesale and retail were
responsible for the overwhelming bulk of sales to criminals.3 1
Litigants can now analyze BATF trace data to show
that over several years, Manufacturer A received, for example,
approximately thirty telephone calls a month from BATF
inquiring about the purchaser of particular weapons that had
been traced to crimes. Manufacturer A's records show that it
sold twelve weapons a month to Distributor B, five weapons a
month to Distributor C, and so forth. In turn, the distributors
receive similar follow-up calls from BATF with respect to their
retailers: the distributors' records show which retailers
received the guns that later were used in crime. Since, as it
turns out, a small and identifiable group of retailers are
responsible for the vast bulk of the sales into the criminal
market, distributors know precisely which retailers' sales
foreseeably resulted in criminal use, and manufacturers know
which distributors sold disproportionately to such retailers.
29 BATF, U.S. DEPT OF TREASURY, FOLLOWING THE GUN: ENFORCING FEDERAL
LAW AGAINST FIREARMS TRAFFICKERS 13, tbl.3 (2000).
30 BATF, U.S. DEPT OF TREASURY, YOUTH CRIME GUN INTERDICTION
INITIATIVE REPORT 5-6 (1999) [hereinafter YOUTH CRIME REPORT]. "Since firearms may
be trafficked along multiple channels, an investigation may be included in more than
one category," PIERCE ET AL., supra note 27, at 13 tbl. 4.
31 The results of the Pierce study, supra note 27, at 16 tbl. 9, were first
reported in the Butterfield article, supra note 26, at 8: "[A] mere 389 federally licensed
dealers, of 104,855 such dealers around the country, sold half the guns used in 1996
and 1997 that could be traced by law enforcement to their initial sale .... See also
BATF, U.S. DEPT OF TREASURY, COMMERCE IN FIREARMS IN THE UNITED STATES 2, tbl.
D3, A-25 (2000) ("Just 1.2 percent of dealers-1,020 of the approximately 83,200
licensed retail dealers and pawnbrokers-accounted for over 57 percent of the crime
guns traced to current dealers in 1998. And just over 450 licensed dealers in 1998 had
10 or more crime guns with a time-to-crime of three years or less traced to them."). The
latter number appears to add up to 491 dealers. A few weeks earlier, Senator Charles
Schumer had released the results of his study, also based on BATF data, concluding
that one percent of FFLs supplied forty-five percent of guns traced to crime. Shannon
McCarthy, Small Number of Dealers Supply Most Guns Used in Crimes, ASSOCIATED
PRESS STATE & LOCAL WIRE, June 8, 1999, a.m. cycle.
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Litigants will have access to this information, 32 and therefore
will be able to identify precisely the manufacturers and
distributors who knew that sales to particular business
customers resulted in criminal use, but nonetheless continued
to supply those customers.
If most crime guns are bought, not stolen, sellers of
guns can greatly influence the degree to which guns flow to the
crime market. Through their records of responses to BATF,
manufacturers can, if they wish, stop dealing with distributors
who then deal with retailers leaking inventory into the hands
of criminals.
But prospective plaintiffs still lack one important
element of a successful negligence claim. They may show that a
"disproportionately" small number of retailers leak a large
number of guns into the crime market. Thus far, however,
plaintiffs have been unable to obtain total handgun sales
figures by retailer to compare them with crime gun traces.
Therefore, they cannot show that particular dealers leak guns
to the criminal market in numbers that are a
disproportionately large part of their total sales. In theory,
"leaks" could be a constant proportion: few guns from dealers
with small total sales volume, many guns from dealers with
large total sales volume. This pattern would not suggest
negligence. With enough volume, the most careful dealer can
sell some guns that end up in criminal hands. Based on
anecdotal evidence, the Hamilton plaintiffs, jury, trial judge,
and others believed that negligence, not volume, accounted for
the leaks.33 But without dealer-by-dealer sales figures to match
against crime gun traces, plaintiffs had no proof that the
negligence of dealers, or of the distributors and manufacturers
who continued to supply them, caused their harm or enhanced
their risk of harm.
If future plaintiffs can show that leakage is not simply a
function of volume, however, courts will find it difficult to
continue to reject claims of negligence. The vast majority of
retailers have managed for years to avoid selling guns into the
32 See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 17-24, Camden
County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, 123 F. Supp. 2d 345 (D.N.J. 2000) (No.
99CV-2518), affid, 273 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001). The complaint was dismissed for lack of
standing, preemption, and lack of duty. 123 F. Supp. 2d 345, 255-64 (D.N.J. 2000).
33 Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 826-33.
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criminal market, arguably by techniques that are not secret.
They attempt to avoid selling to "straw purchasers," persons
who buy illegally on behalf of felons or underage purchasers.
Straw purchasers tend to purchase multiple firearms in a
single transaction. 34 Retailers who refuse to avoid sales to
straw purchasers may be enhancing the public risk resulting
from criminal use. Criminal activity by the ultimate purchaser
may not constitute intervening cause under these
circumstances. 3 5
Retailers are Federal Firearms Licensees ("FFLs"). No
one may sell handguns, except at gun shows, without applying
for and obtaining a license to do so from the federal
government. This requirement helps to assure that most gun
dealers adhere to some standards of respectability. However,
many do not fit the image normally associated with gun shops.
Some do not operate out of retail establishments, but are
"kitchen table" or "back of the truck" dealers.36 Some
distributors continue to supply inventory to gun shows, which
are not even subject to the legal restrictions governing FFLs.
The Court of Appeals found insufficient evidence that
manufacturers and distributors know or have reason to know
that sales to these kinds of outlets result in disproportionate
leakage of guns to the criminal market because plaintiffs
presented only anecdotal evidence connecting such outlets to
crime gun leakage. 37
With the best of efforts and intentions by gun dealers,
some criminals will buy guns. Even if manufacturers insist
that distributors only sell to legitimate storefront retailers,
some people will buy guns to commit crimes. Danger to the
public inheres, then, in the sale of guns. But future plaintiffs
must prove that it makes a great deal of difference how guns
34 See Douglas S. Well, & Rebecca C. Knox, Effects of Limiting Handgun
Purchases on Interstate Transfer of Firearms, 275 J. OF AM. MED. ASS'N 1759 (1996).
35 Kush v. City of Buffalo, 59 N.Y.2d 26, 33, 449 N.E.2d 725, 729, 462 N.Y.S.2d
831, 835 (1983) C' Xhen the intervening, intentional act of another is itself the
foreseeable harm that shapes the duty imposed, the defendant who fails to guard
against such conduct will not be relieved of liability when that act occurs.").
36 BATF, DEPT OF TREASURY, COMMERCE IN FIREARMS IN THE UNITED STATES
16 (Feb. 2000). A random sample inspected in 1998 found that fifty-six percent of FFLs
operated out of residential rather than commercial premises.3 7 See Beretta II, 96 N.Y.2d at 234, 750 N.E.2d at 1062, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
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are sold: without the best of efforts and intentions by sellers,
far more criminals will buy guns.
II. DUTY TO THIRD PARTIES IN NEGLIGENCE
A. Hamilton's Frontal Assault on McCarthy
The 1996 Forni v. Ferguson38 decision appeared at the
time to be the New York courts' last word on the question of
handgun manufacturers' liability for negligence when their
products were used criminally to kill and injure. The Ferguson
court held: "New York does not impose a duty upon a
manufacturer to refrain from the lawful distribution of a non-
defective product. The manufacturer in this case certainly had
no control over the criminal conduct of a third party."39
The Second Circuit the following year, in McCarthy v.
Olin Corp., said: "New York courts do not impose a legal duty
on manufacturers to control the distribution of potentially
dangerous products such as ammunition."40
McCarthy (now U.S. Representative Carolyn McCarthy,
D-N.Y.) had sued the Olin Corporation for negligence and strict
liability for their design, manufacture, marketing, and sale of
Black Talon ammunition, which has exceptionally ferocious
wounding power. In the context of Olin's motion to dismiss
McCarthy's claim, the court accepted McCarthy's allegation
that criminal use of Black Tallon bullets to injure innocent
victims was foreseeable. But, said the trial court, the New York
Court of Appeals separates issues of duty and foreseeability in
the negligence context, unlike the Michigan court upon whose
ruling McCarthy had attempted to rely.41
38 232 A.D.2d 176, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1st Dep't 1996).
39 Id. at 176, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 74 (citation omitted).
40 119 F.3d 148, 157 (2d Cir. 1997).
41 McCarthy v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 916 F. Supp. 366, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
[hereinafter Sturm, Ruger, & Co.] (distinguishing New York law from the law
applicable in Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759 (Mich. 1977)).
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In the widely-publicized Hamilton v. Accu-Tek
decision,42 relatives of deceased handgun crime victims and one
surviving victim sued twenty-five handgun manufacturers,
supplying most of the U.S. market, for negligent marketing
and distribution. After the trial court awarded damages,
defendants appealed to the Second Circuit. Citing Forni and
McCarthy as controlling precedent, defendants protested trial
court Judge Jack Weinstein's recommendation that the Second
Circuit certify the question of duty to the New York Court of
Appeals.43 Judge Cabranes, in dissent, agreed, concluding that
"there are sufficient precedents-from New York courts, from
this Court, and from other jurisdictions-for us to make a
determination of how New York's highest court would rule."44
Nevertheless, on August 16, 2000, the Second Circuit
certified the question of the existence of such a duty to the New
York Court of Appeals. 45 Had the Second Circuit a less
profound understanding of New York law, they would have
reversed the decision of trial court Judge Jack Weinstein on
the straightforward basis of the McCarthy holding.
The holdings in Forni and McCarthy appear to directly
contradict the Hamilton trial court's assertion that "the
method of sale and distribution [of weapons] by producers may
be" tortious.46 It is significant, therefore that in responding to
the certified question of the Second Circuit, the Court of
Appeals refrained from citing either Forni or McCarthy for the
holding that New York law does not impose on weapons
manufacturers a duty of care to third parties.47 In applying the
Court of Appeals' answers to the certified questions, the Second
Circuit, likewise, ignored the Forni and McCarthy holdings. 48
The Second Circuit McCarthy decision occurred in a
context in which the conventional wisdom about crime guns-
that most of them were stolen from the public's existing stock
of weapons--continued to prevail. Not surprisingly, in that
42 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
43 Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.3d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 2000) [hereinafter
Beretta 1].
44 Id. at 47 (Cabranes, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 46-47 (choosing to do so, interestingly, despite opposition to
cert-ification by "all parties to this appeal [emphasis added]").46 Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 825.47 Beretta II, 96 N.Y.2d at 222, 750 N.E.2d at 1055, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
48 Beretta III, 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001).
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context, courts concluded that manufacturers of new weapons
could do nothing that would sufficiently affect criminal
behavior.49  The Forni court thought the manufacturer
"certainly had no control over the criminal conduct of a third
party."50 But the Hamilton trial court ruled on the basis of
testimony strongly suggesting that the Forni court was wrong,
at least from the point of view of probability and statistics.51
The Hamilton trial court had the benefit of then-new
statistical information, based on a review of gun trafficking
investigations in twenty-seven cities, showing that far more
crime guns used by persons under the age of twenty-five were
purchased from FFLs and by straw purchasers than were
stolen.52  Thus, the trial court noted that handgun
manufacturers could "reduc[e] the flow of illegal guns... [by]
declining to do business with careless or unscrupulous FFLs,
limiting sales at unregulated gun shows, and requiring that
first sales of handguns to the public take place only in fully
stocked, responsibly operated stores." 53
The trial court also took note of expert testimony by a
former executive at Smith & Wesson that the manufacturers
could-but do not-force distributors to stop doing business
with retailers who generate unusually large numbers of trace
requests (inquiries from BATF to gun manufacturers,
distributors, and retailers as to the purchasers of their
weapons, identified by serial numbers, used in crimes). Since a
49 McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 157 (2d Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Olin
Corp.] (quoting Pulka v. Edelman, 40 N.Y.2d 781, 785, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 1022, 390
N.Y.S.2d 393, 396 (1976)).
50 Forni v. Ferguson, 232 A.D.2d 176, 176, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (1st Dep't
1996). 5 1 Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 820.
52 YOUTH CRIME REPORT, supra note 30, at 13 (cited in Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp.
2d at 825-26). The trial court also cited Fox Butterfield, New Data Point Blame at Gun
Makers: Fewer Criminals Stole Their Weapons Than Thought, Analysts Say, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 1998, at A8. In addition, the trial court noted the testimony of Joseph
Vince, former chief of the Crime Gun Analysis Branch of the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco & Firearms, who said that" '[I]n the research that we have done, we have not
seen stolen firearms being employed by criminals. The majority of the time we are
seeing them getting them from retail sources.' " Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 830
(quoting Tr. at 1044). Also, New York City Police Lieutenant Kenneth McCann, former
director of the joint NYPD/BATF task force on illegal gun trafficking, testified that of
the guns seized, "a very, very small percentage was reported stolen" Id. at 838
(quoting Tr. at 488).
53 Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 826.
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manufacturer must tell BATF which distributor purchased
crime guns the manufacturer supplied, the manufacturer can
demand that the distributor stop doing business with the
retailers responsible for the leakage, on pain of losing the
manufacturer as a supplier. 54
However, although the Smith & Wesson executive had
testified at trial that some retailers disproportionately leaked
guns to the criminal market, he provided no evidence. 55 It
remained theoretically possible for guns to leak to the criminal
market fairly evenly across the spectrum of retailers, varying
only with sales volume, notwithstanding the apparent
differences in their degree of care in marketing. If that were
indeed the case, it might not be possible for gun manufacturers
to control their liability. If they had no way of establishing a
rational policy to control sales at the retail level, they still
could not significantly lessen the danger and harm to third
parties except by refusing to sell their products altogether.
The Hamilton trial court described practical steps
manufacturers could have taken to reduce the flow of guns to
the criminal market. For instance, manufacturers could have
required distributors to sell only to retailers who had actual
stores, instead of selling out of the backs of trucks or off
kitchen tables. Moreover, manufacturers could have refused to
sell to distributors who insist on supplying retailers who sell at
gun shows. 56 The trial court also relied to some extent on
testimony that the manufacturers "oversupplied" southeastern
"weak law" states, from which less expensive handguns flowed
illegally to New York, where they could be sold at a profit.57
The first question certified by the Second Circuit to the
Court of Appeals was whether firearms manufacturers had a
duty of care to third parties.58 In McCarthy, the Second Circuit
had held that since the Olin Corporation had no special
relationship with Ferguson, the shooter, it had no authority
over him, no ability to control his behavior, and therefore no
5 4 Id. at 831.
55 See infra note 83 and accompanying text.56 Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 831.
57 Id. at 830-31.
58 Beretta I, 222 F.3d at 46.
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duty to do so under New York law.59 There, the Second Circuit
had based its "special relationship" requirement primarily on
Pulka v. Edelman.60 The bane of New York plaintiff lawyers
seeking damages for breaches of duty to third parties in tort,
Pulka v. Edelman stands as shorthand for the proposition that
courts will not find such a duty without "authority and ability
to exercise control."61
In Pulka, a pedestrian passing by was injured by a
customer driving his car out of the defendant's parking garage.
The Court of Appeals said:
[I]n no sense, can it be said that there was, in fact, a reasonable
opportunity to stop drivers from disregarding these precautions in
the same way that such drivers disregard their own sense of the
danger to pedestrians caused by not stopping or by proceeding
recklessly. Accordingly, to say that a duty to use care arose from the
relationship of the garage to its patrons when there was no
opportunity to fulfill that duty, places an unreasonable burden on
the garage, indeed.62
Pulka's progeny, emanating from the Court of Appeals
as well as the Second Circuit, occasionally included language
that suggested a more robust and personal kind of pre-existing
relationship requirement between a defendant and an
immediate tortfeasor than the Court of Appeals' decisions, at
least, actually imply. In one such decision, for example, the
court said, "[W]hatever else may be required, however, at the
minimum such a duty requires an existing relationship
between the defendant and the third person over whom
'charge' is asserted."63 But there, the defendant had had no
authority or ability whatsoever to control the tortfeasor's drunk
driving after defendant fired him. A wide range of possible
relationships could have fallen within the Court of Appeals'
definitional boundaries.
59 Sturm, Ruger and Co., 916 F. Supp. at 369; see also Olin Corp., 119 F.3d at
156-57.
60 Olin Corp., 119 F.3d at 156-57 (citing Pulka v. Edelman, 40 N.Y.2d 781, 358
N.E.2d 1019, 390 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1976)).61 Although a summary of Pulka, the quoted phrase actually appears in Purdy
v. Pub. Admin., 72 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 526, N.E.2d 4, 7, 530 N.Y.S.2d 513, 516 (1988).62 Pulka, 40 N.Y.2d at 784, 358 N.E.2d at 1021, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
63 D'Amico v. Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76, 89, 518 N.E.2d 896, 902, 524 N.Y.S.2d 1,
7 (1987).
2001]
BROOKLYN LAWREVIEW
The Court of Appeals' actual requirements with respect
to the relationship have been far more subtle and nuanced. The
relationship requirement of Pulka itself was based primarily
on a very thoughtful law review article, 64 which counseled:
"[t]he social policies which determine what relationships
require such special assurance [of safety to person and
property on the part of the parties thereto] and what ones are
sufficiently unimportant not to require them are so incredibly
complicated as almost to defy analysis."65
In Pulka, the New York Court of Appeals noted that
Cardozo's rule that "risk imports relation,"66 has been applied
"to determine the scope of duty---only after it has been
determined that there is a duty. '67 But various kinds of "special
relationships" appear to suffice for a duty to exist. In Purdy,
the Court of Appeals found for the defendant because neither of
the defendants had the "necessary authority" or "ability to
exercise control" over the plaintiffs conduct so as to give rise to
a duty on the defendants' part to protect plaintiff, a member of
the general public."68 In the Purdy context, the relationship the
Court of Appeals would appear to have required--"authority"
over the plaintiff-seems to be no more than the legal right to
have stopped her from driving the car with which she
accidentally caused the injury in question. If the Court of
Appeals believes that handgun manufacturers can effectively
exercise power over sales practices of retailers through
distributors, then such manufacturers have the "authority" and
"ability" to withhold guns from criminals to a significant
degree.
In Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 69 the Court of Appeals in
dicta noted that in appropriate circumstances, it could find a
duty where there was neither privity nor foreseeability: "Duty
in negligence cases is defined neither by foreseeability of injury
(Pulka v Edelman, supra, at p. 785) nor by privity of
64 Fowler V. Harper & Posey M. Kime, Duty to Control the Conduct of Another,
43 YALE L. J. 886 (1934) (cited in Pulka, 40 N.Y.2d at 783, 385 N.E.2d at 1021, 390
N.Y.S.2d at 395).
65 Harper & Kime, supra note 64, at 904.
66 Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100, 1928
N.Y. LEXIS 1269, *9 (1928).
67 Pulka, 40 N.Y.2d at 785, 358 N.E.2d at 1022, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
68 Purdy, 72 N.Y.2d at 8, 526 N.E.2d at 7, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
69 65 N.Y.2d 399, 482 N.E.2d 34, 492 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1985).
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contract."70 This statement strongly suggested that the kind of
relationship the defendants argued was needed, a privity-based
relationship, was more than the Court of Appeals would
require.
The Hamilton defendants had argued at trial7' and on
appeal7 2 that the Pulka-Purdy requirement of "authority and
responsibility" required plaintiffs to prove a "special
relationship" either between the defendant and the immediate
tortfeasor, or between the defendant and the victim. Defendant
manufacturers denied any relationship with the shooter or the
victim in the instant case, or ability or authority to control
criminals generally.7 3 Other than with regard to the sufficiency
of the evidence, the defendants failed in this line of their
argument.
Two Court of Appeals cases illustrate the issue. In the
first case, Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear Inc.,74 the Court of
Appeals held that the owner of an office building in a high-
crime location had a duty to safeguard the lobby for business
"invitees." The Hamilton defendants sought to distinguish
these facts deeming the defendant's ownership and control of
the building sufficient to create a "relationship" with the
plaintiff, who was nominally an "invitee."75 But Nallan
illuminates the artificiality of defendants' "special relationship"
construct, a construct that would infuse a kind of
personalization into the relationship that the law does not in
fact require. The "special relationship" between the owner and
the victim in Nallan can only have emerged from the fact that
70 Strauss, 65 N.Y.2d at 402, 482 N.E.2d at 36, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 557.
[A]n obligation rooted in contract may engender a duty owed to those
not in privity. . . [W]hile the absence of privity does not foreclose
recognition of a duty, it is still the responsibility of courts, in fixing
the orbit of duty, 'to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a
controllable degree' and to protect against crushing exposure to
liability. "In fixing the bounds of that duty, not only logic and science,
but policy play an important role."
Id. (citations omitted).71 Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d. at 821.
72 Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants Beretta U.S.A. Corp. and American
Arms, Inc. at 12, Beretta II, 96 N.Y.2d 222, 750 N.E.2d 1055, 727 N.Y.S.2d 7 (2001)
(No. 03401) [hereinafter Reply Brief Beretta I1].
73 Id. at 12-13.
74 50 N.Y.2d 507, 407 N.E.2d 451, 429 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1980).
75 Reply Brief Beretta II, supra note 72, at 13.
20011
BROOKLYN LAWREVIEW
the shooting victim attended a union meeting in the owner's
building, because there was no indication that the owner had
ever met the victim, or even heard of him prior to the claim.
The court would not extend a building owner's duty to a
stranger who was in no sense an invitee. In the second case,
Waters v. New York City Housing Authority,7 6 the Court of
Appeals held that the owner of a housing project owed no duty
to a passerby who was dragged off the street and assaulted.77
Owners could not in fact safeguard such passers-by, so liability
could devastate them financially without improving public
safety.78
The "relationship requirement," then, must enable the
defendant to limit and control liability to potential plaintiffs by
exercising due care, and need not involve an actual
interpersonal encounter. The landlord in Nallan could only
"control" the actions of an immediate tortfeasor or criminal on
his property by creating safety conditions that would affect the
statistical likelihood of criminal behavior to a third party.
Obviously, he had no relationship with any individual criminal,
but he had a duty to third parties nonetheless.
Handgun manufacturers may similarly exercise enough
economic power over business entities further down the stream
of distribution to distributors and retailers, to dictate at least
to some extent the conditions under which they perform their
function. That is, the manufacturer can enforce their adoption
of certain sales policies, like not selling to straw purchasers, or
not selling at gun shows, or otherwise, in the words used in the
proceeding paragraph to describe the nature of the landlord's
"control" of the criminal in Nallan, "creating safety conditions
that would affect the statistical likelihood of criminal behavior
damaging to a third party,"79 which is precisely our description
of the basis for the Nallan landlord's duty to third parties.
That the manufacturers' control in this context is abstract and
statistical, rather than personal, does not distinguish them
from other defendants whose negligence resulted in harm to
third parties in violation of their duty of care. Whether the
76 69 N.Y.2d 225, 505 N.E.2d 922, 513 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1987).
77 Id. at 228-31, 505 N.E.2d at 923, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
78 Id. at 230-31, 505 N.E.2d at 923, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
79 Id.
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final links in the distribution chain-the retailer who sells to
the straw purchaser, the straw purchaser who sells to the
actual shooting criminal-are deemed to exercise authority and
control does not really matter, since the foreseeability of
criminal behavior invalidates any attempt to use criminal
action as an "intervening cause" shielding the earlier links in
the chain from liability.80
The trial court in Hamilton heard testimony that some
manufacturers can and do require distributors to enforce
contractual provisions against retailers that publish off-pricing
or even publish certain wholesale prices.8s If a gun
manufacturer stands in that kind of relationship to the
downstream entities with which it does business, then,
assuming plaintiffs could show that particular practices by
retailers disproportionately leaked guns to the criminal
market, manufacturers who "control" retailers, in effect
"control" the actions of criminals.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the Hamilton
plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the defendants could have
done anything significant to have prevented harm to the
plaintiffs.8 2 Although witnesses at the Hamilton trial suggested
steps manufacturers could take to reduce the flow of guns to
the criminal market, they had "presented no evidence . . .
showing any statistically significant relationship between
particular classes of dealers [such as those who fail to take the
proposed precautions] and crime guns. 83 The Court of Appeals
decided, therefore, that plaintiffs in Hamilton were analogous
to the plaintiff in Waters, not to the plaintiff in Nallan. But
once a plaintiff shows that the actual behavior of gun dealers
meaningfully increased his or her risk of harm, the results will
be different, for manufacturers who know the results of such
negligence are positioned in the chain of commerce to control it.
80 'When the intervening, intentional act of another is itself the foreseeable
harm that shapes the duty imposed, the defendant who fails to guard against such
conduct will not be relieved of liability when that act occurs." Kush, 59 N.Y.2d at 33,
449 N.E.2d at 729, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 835 (quoted in Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 834).
81 Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 832 (quoting the testimony of Robert Hass, a
former executive at Smith & Wesson: " 'These retailers could be cut off,' he noted,
'blust in the same way a retailer would be cut off who broke price and published ads
and God knows we did that enough.' Tr[anscript] 2330.").
82 Beretta II, 96 N.Y.2d at 236, 750 N.E.2d at 1063, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
83 Id.
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The New York Court of Appeals in Hamilton has suggested the
strong possibility that any objections to the nature of the
relationship between gun manufacturer and criminal or victim
would be cured as soon as plaintiffs show that actual
negligence increased their risk of harm.
B. Alternative Theories of Handgun Manufacturer Liability
to Third Parties in Negligence
Defendant gun manufacturers have argued that to find
duty to third parties in tort the law requires relationships of a
concrete and somewhat personal nature. Although the New
York courts have sometimes used language in the past that
encouraged that view, the Court of Appeals in Hamilton
implicitly rejected it. If plaintiffs can rely on that implication,
their new course is clear enough. If not, plaintiffs may utilize
two alternative theories, especially if gun manufacturers
successfully allege that they do not control the manner in
which downstream sellers market the product.
Legal theory does not always concede that public policy
is a primary consideration. But courts are expected to apply
public policy considerations when they decide whether or not to
find a duty to third parties in tort.84 New York jurisprudence,
as that of other states, has been less expansive in this regard,
generally requiring a pre-existing relationship between the
defendant and the tortfeasor or between the defendant and the
victim before conceding that the defendant had a duty to the
victim. 85 The New York Court of Appeals has often explained
84 PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS ch. 9, § 53, 358 (5th ed., 1984). See also Palka
v. Servicemaster Mgmt. Serv. Corp., 83 N.Y.2d 579, 587, 634 N.E.2d 189, 193, 611
N.Y.S.2d 817, 820 (1994) (stating that relevant public policy factors should include
"reasonable expectations of parties and society generally, the proliferation of claims,
the likelihood of unlimited or insurer-like liability, disproportionate risk and
reparation allocation, and public policies affecting the expansion or limitation of new
channels of liability"); Waters, 69 N.Y.2d at 229, 505 N.E.2d at 923-24, 513 N.Y.S.2d at
358; DeAngelis v. Lutheran Medical Center, 58 N.Y.2d 1053, 1055, 449 N.E.2d 406,
407, 462 N.Y.S.2d 626, 627 (1983).
85 See, e.g., for New York, Pulka v. Edelman, 40 N.Y.2d 781, 358 N.E.2d 1019,
390 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1976); Purdy v. Pub. Admin., 72 N.Y.2d 1, 526 N.E.2d 4, 530
N.Y.S.2d 513 (1988); McCarthy v. Sturm, Ruger, Co., 916 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), affd sub nom; McCarthy v. Olin, 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997); for Florida,
Penelas v. Arms Tech., 738 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001), Lighthouse Mission
of Orlando, Inc. v. Estate of McGovern, 683 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996),
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that if it did not require such relationships, it might be
imposing "limitless" and "crushing" liability on defendants who
could neither control what tortfeasors do with their products
and services, nor protect victims from tortfeasors. 86 In view of
this aspect of New York law, an unscrupulous proprietor could
hire an independent contractor to undertake such tasks as
would involve direct encounters with customers, when such
encounters might increase the likelihood that the customers
would become tortfeasors or victims.
The notion of an "independent contractor" derives from
the likelihood that when an entity engages another under
contract to perform a service, the one for whom the service is to
be performed does not control the manner of performance.
Rather, in contrast with an employee, the independent
contractor only warrants to produce the result required, not to
produce it in any particular manner.8 7
Potential tortfeasors, thus, could strategically interpose
barriers to privity between themselves and victims to preclude
liability. The obvious strategic defense was to employ
independent contractors to perform those aspects of one's
business that included dangerous activities. The manufacturer
would have had no relationship with the contractor's own
independent subcontractor, and surely none with the random
victim of the latter's negligence. Thus, the manufacturer could
export those risks and costs of doing the dangerous part of his
or her business onto the end subcontractor, or, as is often the
Austin v. Mylander, 717 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); for Ohio, Gelbman v.
Second NaVl Bank, 458 N.E.2d 1262 (Ohio 1984), Simpson v. Big Bear Stores Co., 652
N.E.2d 702 (Ohio 1995). Compare Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759 (Mich. 1977)
(discussing how Michigan does not treat separately the questions of foreseeability and
the existence of a duty).
86 See, e.g., Pulka, 40 N.Y.2d at 786, 358 N.E.2d at 1023, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 397;
Strauss, 65 N.Y.2d at 401, 482 N.E.2d at 35, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
87 If the court finds that the manufacturers did not have a relationship with
their distributors that gave them the ability to exercise authority over the manner in
which the distributors performed the task for which they were under written or oral
contract to perform for the manufacturers, then they were independent contractors. An
independent contractor is not subject to the control of the employer as to how he or she
performs the work but only for the results of the contracted-for work. See e.g. G.D.
Searle & Co. v. Medicore Communications, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 895, 904-05 (S.D.N.Y.
1994); Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 142-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
Beach v. Belzy, 238 N.Y. 100, 143 N.E. 805, 1924 N.Y. LEXIS 653 (1924); Uppington v.
City of New York, 165 N.Y. 222, 59 N.E. 91, 1901 N.Y. LEXIS 1409 (1901); Tytell v.
Battery Beer Distrib., Inc., 608 N.Y.S.2d 225, 226, 202 A.D.2d 226 (1st Dept. 1994).
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case, onto the random victims if the subcontractor had "shallow
pockets." Similarly, but under a slightly different theory, the
manufacturer may deal through some legitimate and careful
independent contractors, and through other illegitimate and
careless independent contractors who would do business with a
riskier and more profitable end of the market, for example, the
gun trafficker who purchases in quantity for resale to
criminals.
Therefore, one of the presumptions under which
manufacturers traditionally escaped liability even when they
produced the guns used to inflict injury, is that they do not
exercise control over the manner in which their guns are sold.
Rather, they enter into arms-length sales contracts with their
distributors, who enter into arms-length contracts with their
retailers, who engage in arms-length sales to purchasers, who
engage in arms-length sales to criminals. At each stage of the
process, everyone is an independent contractor.
Principals ordinarily cannot be held liable for the
negligence of their independent contractors for the same reason
that principals cannot control the manner in which those
contractors meet their contractual obligations.8 8 The law,
however, has developed exceptions to this rule. Employers have
a duty to third parties for the negligence of their independent
contractors when the independent contractor negligently
performs an assignment the employer knows or should know is
inherently or foreseeably dangerous.8 9 The employer also has a
duty to third parties for negligent work performed by an
incompetent independent contractor the employer hired
negligently.90 These legal doctrines could stand ready for use
against handgun manufacturers if plaintiffs can link the
negligence of "independent contractors," or gun dealers, to an
increased risk of harm to plaintiffs.91
88 See authority cited supra, note 86.
89 Rosenberg v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 79 N.Y.2d 663, 664, 584
N.Y.S.2d 765, 767-78, 595 N.E.2d 840, 842 (1992).
90 Hesch v. Seavey, 188 A.D.2d 808, 809, 591 N.Y.S.2d 546, 547 (3d Dept.
1992). See also Maristany v. Patient Support Servs., Inc., 264 A.D.2d 302, 303, 693
N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (1st Dep't 1999).
91 In analogous product liability cases, the delegation of responsibilities to
dealers to assemble, adjust, or inspect parts or all of a vehicle did not relieve the
manufacturers of their non-delegable duties toward ultimate purchasers. Sabloff v.
Yamaha Motor Co., 273 A.2d 606, 612 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), affid, 283 A.2d. 321
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In addition, the courts have not required extreme
danger, only "inherent" danger. Juries have found such
"inherent" danger in cleaning mats with soap and water on a
New York City sidewalk,9 2 painting billboards up on a scaffold
over the street,93 or replacing elevator doors while keeping the
elevator running.94 Likewise, the sale of lethal weapons is an
inherently dangerous activity. Even with the exercise of
reasonable care, weapons may get into the wrong hands.
Without the exercise of such care, far more weapons leak to the
criminal market. When most people believed that most
criminals stole their guns, one could have argued that a sale
was not particularly dangerous. The revelation that more
criminals buy their guns, however, has made manifest the
danger inherent in the sale of guns. Under these
circumstances, if defendant handgun manufacturers cannot
control their distributors, then each defendant has a duty that
is "non-delegable and, though blameless, it is liable for the
independent contractor's negligence. '95  Thus, defendants
cannot escape liability by interposing an independent
contractor between themselves and victims of negligence in
their dangerous endeavors. The defendant can delegate the
dangerous task, but not the legal duty. The duty of care, and
liability for its breach, remains with the defendant.9 6
Without explicit reference to any such theory, the U.S.
Supreme Court found that a manufacturer of a legal but
controlled pharmaceutical had a sufficient duty to the public to
exercise care that it imposed criminal liability for its breach of
that duty.97 The company had filled large orders for the drug
from a physician in a small town. The quantities that were
(1971); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964).
However, the independent contractor context of "dangerous activity" makes for a
different analytical outcome, and therefore should not be confused with the treatment
recommended for "ultrahazardous activity" in the product liability context in James A.
Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The
Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1321 (1991).
92 Wright v. Tudor City Twelfth Unit, Inc., 276 N.Y. 303, 307, 12 N.E.2d 307,
308, 1938 N.Y. LEXIS 1189, *9 (1938).
93 Rohlfs v. Wel, 271 N.Y. 444, 3 N.E.2d 588, 1936 N.Y. LEXIS 1221 (1936).
94 Besner v. Central Trust Co., 230 N.Y. 357, 130 N.E. 577, 1921 N.Y. LEXIS
844 (1921).95 Rosenberg, 79 N.Y.2d at 666, 595 N.E.2d at 842, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 767,.
96 Id. at 668, 595 N.E.2d at 843, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
97 Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943).
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ordered and sent exceeded the amount likely to be used for
legitimate and lawful purposes. 98 The defendants in Hamilton
attempted to distinguish this case, noting that the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics (the precursor of today's Drug
Enforcement Agency) had previously warned the company that
the morphine had leaked into the criminal market.99 However,
through crime gun trace request telephone calls from BATF,
gun manufacturers likewise receive warnings, whether or not
they were intended as such, that their products leak into the
criminal market.
The knowing or careless selection of distributors who
take no precautions against leakage to the criminal market
would bring handgun manufacturers under the second
exception to the immunizing principals for the torts of their
independent contractors. When BATF seeks daily crime gun
purchaser information from a gun manufacturer, and the
manufacturer finds, ten or thirty or a hundred times a year,
that a particular distributor leaked those guns to the criminal
market, then that manufacturer has reason to know of the
"incompetence," or worse, of that particular independent
contractor. (This again assumes that manufacturers or others
eventually establish that leakage levels do not just vary with
volume, but correlate to negligence or corruption.) The same
analysis applies to the distributor whose records show that
particular retailers constitute vastly disproportionate leaks of
handguns to the criminal market.
Thus, either gun manufacturers exercise economic
control over distributors and retailers to the extent that they
can enforce their wishes as to the manner in which handguns
are sold, or they do not. If the former, manufacturers may
exercise authority and responsibility sufficient to make
distributors and retailers liable to victims for the negligence of
their agents. If the latter, manufacturers cannot delegate to
their contractors a duty to those victims but must retain it
themselves. The danger in the sale of handguns renders
nondelegable the duty to assure public safety; the negligent
selection of incompetent independent contractors likewise
prevents delegation of the duty to those contractors.
98 Id.
99 Reply Brief Beretta II, supra note 77, at 22.
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III. PROPORTIONAL CAUSATION
A. Why the Preponderance Standard in Hamilton Did Not
Prevail
Questions of collective liability as well as proximate
cause occupied a great deal of the Hamilton trial court's
attention. The only plaintiff to win damages for his gunshot
injuries was unable to identify the manufacturer of the
particular handgun that was used to cause the injury. With no
one manufacturer linked to the weapon, plaintiff had no choice
but to argue that the range of possible manufacturers bore
collective liability, an argument that virtually begged the
question of cause-in-fact. With respect to proximate cause, the
trial court summarized the testimony of the plaintiffs expert
as follows: Gun manufacturers' negligent marketing and
distribution resulted in widespread and easy availability of .25
caliber handguns to criminals and to underage purchasers and
in consequent injuries to shooting victims. In particular and for
example, Alfred Adkins illegally purchased and used such a
gun to shoot and cripple his friend and fellow teenager Stephen
Fox, a plaintiff in the instant case. 100
With respect to collective liability, the court agreed with
plaintiffs' analogy of "illegal handguns to deadly pathogens[]"
and therefore applied a liability theory used in mass toxic tort
cases when "circumstances... made it impossible for plaintiffs
to determine which one of a number of manufacturers made
the particular unit of the product which caused the
injury. . . ."101
However, most of the argument in Hamilton centered
on causation.10 2 The court permitted the jury to determine
100 Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
101 Id. at 834, 836 (citing Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539
N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1989) for market share liability, which the Hamilton
trial court applied).
102 See generally Trial Transcript, Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d
802 (1999) (on file with author).
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whether a preponderance of the evidence established
defendants' market share liability, 10 3 and concluded:
Proof of the sales history of the specific gun used in the Fox shooting
is not required. Plaintiff need only produce evidence from which a
fair-ihinded jury could conclude that the Fox defendants failed to
market and distribute their product-a .25 caliber handgun-
reasonably in light of all the circumstances. They have met that
burden.
104
At oral argument before the Second Circuit,105 the panel
asked the plaintiffs' attorney how she could link a defendant to
the gun that was used to shoot the injured plaintiff since the
gun was never recovered. She referred to the testimony that
the shooter bought the gun from a trafficker who sold it out of
the back of his truck, and who had himself purchased it down
South, in a pattern that usually includes a straw purchase
from an FFL. The defendant's failure to impose requirements
through its distributors to its FFL retailers, she suggested,
typified the kind of behavior that made possible the rest of the
process: sale by FFL to straw purchaser, subsequent sale to
criminal, and shooting of victim.
However, the Court of Appeals noted that plaintiffs had
not met the "but for" test: had gunmaker defendants taken all
the actions plaintiffs alleged constituted the exercise of their
duty of care, Stephen Fox, the injured plaintiff, might well still
have been shot. The gun in question might have been obtained
by the trafficker through a non-negligent retail sale, or from a
group of weapons stolen from non-negligent retailers, or even
from citizens, although most are not. Had the trafficker not
supplied the weapon, the shooter might have borrowed one
from a friend, or stolen one himself. It might not have made
any difference had the defendant gun manufacturers forced
their distributors to cut off retailers who engaged in multiple
sales, repeatedly had crime guns traced to them, sold at gun
shows, or were not well-stocked storefront establishments. 0 6
103 Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
104 Id. at 829.
105 Oral argument for Hamilton v. Beretta, No. 99-7753(L), attended March 13,
2000.
106 Beretta II, 96 N.Y. 2d at 232-33, 750 N.E.2d at 1060-61, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 12-
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Thus, had defendants not engaged in any of the
behavior that the plaintiffs claimed constituted negligent
marketing, the man who shot Fox might still have obtained the
gun he used. In rejecting plaintiffs' effort to show that
defendants could have prevented their injuries, the Court of
Appeals recognized that this possibility made it difficult for
plaintiffs. In adopting a "preponderance of the evidence"
standard, plaintiffs undertook to show that defendants did
more than merely increase plaintiffs' risk of harm. They had to
show, instead, that defendants were more than fifty percent
likely to have "caused" the harm, and that defendants'
behavior supplied the "specific causal link" to the plaintiffs'
injuries. 10 7
When a plaintiff cannot identify which manufacturer
produced the particular "unit of the product" that caused the
injury (the "indeterminate defendant" problem), New York has
used market share liability to apportion liability among
defendants. But the plaintiff must still establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the product caused the
injury. 08 For the appropriate analogy to hold in Hamilton,
plaintiffs were required to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendants' behavior caused the injury. The
Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiffs had not done
so.
10 9
Ironically, one of the trial judge's prior opinions offers a
causation theory, proportional causation, that fits the facts of
Hamilton.l l0  In Hamilton, Judge Weinstein found that
plaintiffs need not settle for the substantially smaller awards
likely to be available under the proportional causation theory
because the evidence they had presented satisfied the
requirements of the preponderance standard, under which they
107 Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 834; see generally id.
108 Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 512, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 1078, n.2.
109 Accu-Tek, 96 N.Y.2d at 236, 750 N.E.2d at 1063, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
110 In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y.
1984), where Judge Weinstein utilized proportional causation to distribute the
proceeds of a settlement. In that administrative context, such utilization did not of
course constitute precedent as a matter of tort law. See John C. P. Goldberg &
Benjamin Zipursky, Concern for Cause: A Comment on the Twerski-Sebok Plan for
Administering Negligent Marketing Claims Against Gun Manufacturers, 32 CONN. L.
REV. 1411, 1415, n.13 (2000).
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could win larger awards."' But the Court of Appeals, in
rejecting Judge Weinstein's application of the preponderance
standard and market share liability,112 suggested that a
successful plaintiff might well pursue damages under the
proportional causation theory.113
B. Why 'Tndeterminate Plaintiff'!'Tndeterminate
Defendant" Settings Make a Better Fit With Proportional
Causation
Until the advent of proportional causation theory,
courts responded to problems analogous to the problem in
Hamilton in an inconsistent manner. That is, when the
defendant's behavior increased the risk to the plaintiff, but
there was no way to tell whether the particular plaintiff would
have suffered injury in the absence of the defendant's behavior,
courts sometimes let the causation question go to the jury and
sometimes they did not. The defendant's apparent moral
culpability and social status were among the factors that
influenced the courts' distinctions.
A seminal 1956 Stanford Law Review article by Wes
Malone 114 provided several illustrations. When two fires, one
caused by a railroad's negligence and one of unknown origin,
merged to damage plaintiffs property,115 or when two
motorcycles simultaneously made noise near a horse which,
frightened, ran off, injuring the plaintiff,116 the courts did not
simply reject plaintiffs' claims for failure to establish
causation. Instead, in "combined force" cases of this kind, they
permitted juries to assess damages equally against defendants
11 1 Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
112 Beretta II, 96 N.Y.2d at 234-42, 750 N.E.2d at 1062-68, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 14-
20.
113 Id. at 241, 750 N.E.2d at 1067, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 19, n.11.
114 Wes S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STANFORD L. REV.
60 (1956).
115 Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920),
cited in Malone, supra note 114, at 89, n.72.
116 Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69 (Mass. 1902), cited in Malone, supra note 114,
at 89, n.71.
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whose identical behavior created equal risk of harm, regardless
of the fact that only one and not the other must have "caused"
the harm.117
At the time in other cases, such as medical malpractice
cases, the fact that better treatment would have increased a
patient's chance from twenty percent to forty percent was not
enough for the court to allow a finding of causation." 8 Courts
permitted juries to assess damages against defendants in some
cases when no determination of actual cause-in-fact was
possible, generally when the juries saw the defendants, one of
whom must truly have caused the injury, all as wrongdoers. n 9
The social status of the defendant class at the time influenced
such perceptions. 20 But after Congress enacted legislation
extending provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act to
sailors, the courts found that employers had a duty to take
precautions against danger to sailors. Subsequently, the courts
began to find causation against ship owners who didn't provide
life preservers. 121
Professors Twerski and Sebok 122 extend Malone's life
preserver discussion with this scenario: Say we know that life
preservers would have prevented one out of three sailors from
drowning, but we do not know which one. Decedents of a sailor
who really drowned because defendants neglected to provide a
lifesaver might not recover, because no one would ever know or
could ever prove that he would have lived. Decedents of a sailor
who would have drowned anyway might recover. 128
When the evidence supported less than a fifty percent
likelihood of causation, courts could not allow findings of
causation under a strict preponderance theory. So victims of
some defendants whose behavior had indeed caused harm
117 Malone, supra note 114, at 89.
118 See Kuhn v. Banker, 13 N.E.2d 242 (Ohio 1938); Connellan v. Coffey, 187
A. 901 (Conn. 1936), cited in Malone, supra note 114, at 87, n.66 ('rhis would throw
the physician open to more claims that it is felt would be proper' at the time).
119 Malone, supra note 114, at 84.
12 0 Id. at 86.
121 Id. at 76-77.
122 Aaron Twerski & Anthony Sebok, Liability Without Cause?
Further Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact as Applied to Handgun Liability, 32 CONN. L.
REV. 1379, 1380-81 (2000).
123 Id. at 1387.
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would never recover damages. 124 When the evidence supported
more than a fifty percent likelihood, but of course not certitude,
a preponderance of the evidence sufficed to show causation.
Therefore, in some such cases, defendants would be held liable
for harms they had not inflicted; and the use of such decisions
as precedent, for the same class of defendants, would multiply
damages against that class for the cost of harms they had not
inflicted.125
Under proportional causation, defendants are held
liable only for the excess risk their behavior contributed to the
plaintiffs situation. Thus, in the drowning sailor illustration,
decedents of the drowned sailor could recover one-third of the
damages his death imposed, because he might or might not
have been the one sailor in three whose life would have been
saved by the life preserver. Defendants are held liable for
destroying his one-third chance of surviving.
In the context of multiple defendants, one defendant's
behavior may have increased risk more than another's, so the
calculation of damages becomes more complicated than
apportioning the risk equally over the defendants. In an earlier
decision,126 Judge Weinstein suggested an illustration in which
1,100 people developed cancer after exposure to a toxic
carcinogen, one hundred more than without exposure.
Damages average one million dollars per cancer victim, but no
victim knew which of the ten product manufacturers were
responsible for that particular victim's cancer, and obviously no
victim out of the 1,100 knew which victims were the one
hundred who would not have developed cancer but for the
defendant's product. Under these circumstances, Judge
Weinstein suggested that with equal toxicity, the ten
124 Under the "strong" version of preponderance theory, even with a greater
than fifty percent probability of causation, courts do not impose liability without some
"particularistic" proof that an individual defendant's behavior caused the particular
victim's injury. With strict application of that version of the theory, then, virtually no
mass tort plaintiff would ever recover damages. See David Rosenberg, The Causal
Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97
HARv. L. REV. 849, 857 (1984).
125 This would be an improper result: "[t]o the extent that a risk is attributable
to unknown or nonculpable sources or to the victim's own recklessness, the victim
should bear the loss unless society has decided to absorb it collectively.[Citations
omitted.]" Id. at 880.
126 In re Agent Orange Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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manufacturers together would have been liable for the cost of
the "extra" cancers (one hundred times one million dollars =
one hundred million dollars), so each manufacturer would have
had to pay each of the 1,100 victims 1/1100th of one hundred
million dollars, or about $90,000 each. While this gives each
victim far less than his or her full damages for the illness, it
gives each victim the damages proportionate to the
manufacturers' behavior in increasing the likelihood that the
victim would incur the illness. 127
In some medical malpractice cases, negligent failure to
diagnose cancer at an earlier stage of the cancer could increase
a patient's mortality risk from sixty-one percent to seventy-five
percent. 12 The patient's subsequent death could not, then, be
attributed to the negligence of the physician by a
preponderance of the evidence: it "merely" increased the risk
fourteen percent. But some courts have awarded damages as
follows: the percentage risk times what damages would have
been for full liability for the death. 12 9 As one such court
explained, "A patient with cancer ... would pay to have a
choice between three unmarked doors-behind two of which
were death, with life the third option. A physician who
deprived the patient of this opportunity, even though only a
one-third chance, would have caused her real harm."180
In a different context, Professors Twerski and Cohen
discuss a form of negligence which increases a patient's risk of
$100,000 worth of harm from seventeen percent to twenty
percent. Out of one hundred patients, twenty will suffer the
adverse consequences, but only three will suffer as a result of
the physician's negligence. That negligence will have imposed
$300,000 of harm, but under the preponderance rule, no
patient would recover any damages. Under the proportional
causation rule, each of the twenty patients will recover
$15,000, the proportion of the harm equal to the degree by
127 Id. at 837-38.
128 Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 476-
79 (Wash. 1983).
129 See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in Informed
Consent. Comparing Physicians to Each Other, 94 N.W. U. L. REV. 1, 20-21, n.48 (citing
nine medical malpractice cases). See also Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 479, 486-487
(Pearson, J., concurring).
130 Twerski & Cohen, supra note 129, at 16 (quoting Woilen v. DePaul Health
Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Mo. 1992)).
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which the doctor increased the patients' risk of suffering that
harm. The physician will pay a total of $300,000: precisely the
total damage attributable to his negligence.13' Physician A
pays the damage amount he should pay. Since none of his
twenty patients knows or can prove which actually suffered
because of A's negligence, each gets a pro rata share.
C. Why Proportional Causation Should Succeed For
Handgun Injury Plaintiffs
Applying proportional causation to the Hamilton case
poses practical challenges, but not theoretical ones. In
Hamilton, the jury translated behavioral differences among
defendants into findings of liability or non-liability for
negligence, and then applied market share to apportion
damages. In a new case brought against handgun
manufacturers utilizing data made available subsequent to the
Hamilton trial, a jury would have to translate behavioral
differences more finely into percentage degrees of risk
enhancement. Testimony could be brought to bear on that task.
Plaintiffs may eventually be able to show that permitting sales
at gun shows, and permitting multiple sales to the same
purchaser by retailers, increases the risk of gun violence to
third party victims among the public. BATF found there were
five times as many crime guns leaked through FFLs to New
York City during one nine-month period as handgun permits
were issued by the city in that same period. 132 Plaintiffs would
still have to demonstrate that distribution and sales methods
alleged to be negligent did in fact disproportionately cause
guns to enter the criminal market, but it seems likely that such
behavior increases risk. Studies covering 1986 through 1992
quantified "excess murders" during that period for all age
groups at about twelve percent, 183 and concluded that "the
131 Id. at 30.
132 YOUTH CRIME REPORT, supra note 30, at 1; "New Licenses Issued by the
License Division, " Police Department, City of New York, under cover letter of 6/22/99
from Inspector John J. Hudson, Commanding Officer, License Division.
133 Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 19-20 (1995). The twelve percent represents the likely
increase over the baseline murder rate of earlier (and most likely, later) periods, but
the quantity of homicides potentially attributable to easy access to guns by criminals
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lethality of the ubiquitous guns contributed in a major way to
the doubling of the homicide rate by (and of) those 18 and
under."'3 4 These studies were not offered into evidence for the
Hamilton trial.
BATF data suggested to the Hamilton trial court that
defendants had increased the risk to plaintiffs by thirty-three
percent. If so, proof of causation by a preponderance of the
evidence would seem arithmetically impossible. Citing
Professors Twerski and Sebok's analysis135 the Court of
Appeals noted that even if plaintiffs had persuaded it to
recognized a duty of care owed by defendants, the appropriate
measure of damages would have reflected the thirty-three
percent risk enhancement, not the full damage assessment
associated with the preponderance rule. 136 In any case, none of
the plaintiffs' evidence persuaded the court that the
defendants' alleged negligent marketing and distribution had
increased the risk to plaintiffs in any way that could be
quantified or separated out from the overall risk posed by guns
in the United States generally.13 7 But with the proper factual
foundation, proportional causation, as the court suggested,
makes a far better logical "fit" in an indeterminate
plaintifflindeterminate defendant combination case, like
Hamilton, where plaintiffs at best will only be able to show risk
enhancements by defendants at a level below fifty percent.
CONCLUSION
Future plaintiffs may be expected to seek proof that
handgun manufacturers exercise control over the degree to
which their product will be used to generate injury and
destruction. Courts need no longer believe that they must defer
to legislatures to impose liability, and may utilize available
and youth may include some of the ongoing baseline as well, bringing the total well
above twelve percent.
134 Alfred Blumstein, The Context of Recent Changes in Crime Rates, Panel
Paper, National Institute of Justice and Executive Office for Weed and Seed,
Washington, D.C., Jan. 5-7, 1998.
135 See supra notes 110-112.
136 96 N.Y.2d 222, 241, 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1067, 727 N.Y.S.2d 7, 19 (2001).
137 Id. at 234, 750 N.E.2d at 1062, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
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and well-established theories of liability to impose
responsibility where it truly belongs.
Although neither the Hamilton plaintiffs nor anyone
else to date has yet come forward with dispositive evidence of a
causal relationship between the negligent marketing and
distribution of handguns on the one hand and increased risk to
victims on the other, only the capture of that evidence-and
not, any longer, an apparent barrier of legal theory-stands
between handgun manufacturers and liability on a negligence
claim. New York jurisprudence is now open for change with
far-reaching potential consequences for both handgun
manufacturers, and gunshot victims.
What seemed to be settled law after McCarthy, "New
York courts do not impose a legal duty on manufacturers to
control the distribution of potentially dangerous products such
as ammunition,"13 8 now is not.
138 Olin Corp., 119 F.3d at 157.
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